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A Historic Moment:
Black Voters and the
1992 Presidential
Race
by
Clarence Lusane
November 2, 1991, may well be remembered as a
watershed date in the unique and quixotic 1992 presi-
dential race. On that day, stating that he would "not seek
the nomination for the Democratic Party," 1 Jesse Jack-
son backed out of the presidential campaign spotlight
and started a chain reaction that has put the black vote in
perhaps its least influential position since before 1984.
Extremely low black voter turnout was one of the
most significant trends of the 1992 primaries. In the
Democratic contests, Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton
won an impressive percentage of black votes, about 70
percent. However, those votes were garnered in the
context of the smallest black voter turnout for a presi-
dential primary in a decade.
In key states, particularly in the South, black voter
turnout in the 1992 primaries was embarrassingly de-
pressed. Clinton won less than half of the votes that
Jackson received in 1988 in Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Texas.
Jackson won more than 1.8 million votes in those states
while Clinton managed to win less than 860,000. In
1 988, 1 1 3,286 blacks voted for Jackson in the Tennessee
primary; in 1992, Clinton won only 35,086 black votes.
Extremely low black voter turnout was one of
the most significant trends of the 1992
primaries.
In Louisiana, Jackson's black vote was 245,784 com-
pared to Clinton's 85,951 in 1992. In 1988, Jackson won
9 1 percent and 88 percent of the black vote in Illinois and
Maryland, respectfully. Clinton's black vote in those
two states, in a less crowded field, was only 70 percent
and 49 percent, respectfully. Overall, Clinton averaged
between 49 percent and 90 percent of the black vote
during the primary, while in 1988, Jackson averaged
between 88 percent and 95 percent of the black vote. 2
According to exit polls conducted during the last
primaries in late May and early June, black voter dissat-
isfaction with Clinton had increased. USA Today re-
ported that Clinton's appeal to black voters had fallen to
about 50 percent. 3 Meanwhile, Clinton's hold on black
voters was being challenged by the campaign of Texas
billionaire H. Ross Perot. In California, Perot was
attracting support from about 1 8 percent ofblacks across
the state, according to USA Today.4 In Los Angeles, 22
percent of the blacks who voted in the primary voiced
support for Perot. Nationwide, according to a CBS
News poll, Perot was winning at least 12 percent of the
black vote. 5
However, when the primary season came to an end in
June, Clinton had secured more Democratic primary
victories than any candidate since Lyndon Johnson. 6
Having vanquished all comers, there was little question
that Clinton was solidly in control of the nomination. In
addition, President Bush's ratings were at an all-time
low for a sitting president, about 33-35 percent. 7 In any
other presidential election year, the Democratic
nominee's camp would be in a state of unabridged
celebration. As it turned out, however, it was not the
expected challengers who were the problem, but the
unanticipated, and then underestimated, outsider who
changed the overall picture of the race.
By the end of June, poll after poll showed Perot
leading Bush with Clinton generally coming in third. 8 It
became clear that electorate animosity was aimed not
only at the White House, but also Congress and the
Democratic party. In addition, Clinton's early primary
scandals (questions concerning adultery, draft dodging,
and marijuana smoking) had severely damaging effects
on his campaign and led many to believe that he was
headed towards defeat.
Politically skittish about the perception of being held
hostage by the so-called special interest groups, blacks
and organized labor, and, more often than not, seeking to
keep his distance from Jesse Jackson, Clinton's cam-
paign (and most of the rest of the Democratic party
leadership) carried out a strategy that sought to win
white, mainly suburban, mostly middle-class votes. This
group of voters is popularly known as the Reagan
8
Democrats because they voted for Ronald Reagan in
1980 and 1984, and, to a lesser degree, for George Hush
in 1988. In selecting Clinton, a moderate Democrat \\ ho
criticized traditional Democratic social programs. Demo-
cratic party conservatives hoped to send a signal thai n
was time for the Reagan Democrats to come home.
Black Voters' Discontent
Clinton's troubles with the black vote can be ac-
counted for in a number of ways. First, after two
presidential elections in which Jackson ran strong in the
primaries, a large number of blacks were not motivated
to vote for a white candidate. When Jackson declined to
run and Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder left the race
early, many blacks concluded that the remaining candi-
dates, all of whom were white, had few ties to black
voters and had expressed little interest in black commu
nity concerns.
Second, Clinton's positions on many issues do not sit
well with many black political activists. His positions
supporting the death penalty, calling for welfare reform,
proposing prison work camps, and pledging tax breaks
for the "middle class"—widely interpreted to mean
middle-class whites—make many black activists wary.
Clinton 's plea for racial harmony was offset by
his unwillingness to addressforthrightly
concerns expressed by black voters.
His incessant call to "save the middle class," led some
blacks to initially support Jerry Brown orTom Harkin in
the early days of the primary season. Clinton's plea for
racial harmony was offset by his unwillingness to ad-
dress forthrightly concerns expressed by black voters.
While Jackson in his campaigns highlighted the breadth
of interests expressed by the black community, includ-
ing South Africa, Haiti, affirmative action, funding for
social programs, and aid to the inner cities, Clinton only
raised these issues in a very limited way and, generally,
only with black audiences.
Third, Clinton's public spats with Jackson also alien-
ated him from many blacks. At one point, when he was
erroneously informed that Jackson had endorsed an-
other candidate, Clinton lost his cool and let loose an
emotional outburst that was captured on videotape,
shrieking that what Jackson did was ". . . an outrage. A
dirty, double-crossing, back-stabbing thing to do. For
him to do this, forme to hear this on a television program
is an act of absolute dishonor."9 Clinton also snubbed
Jackson by not inviting him to speak before a meeting of
the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), the organi-
zation of conservative Democrats over which Clinton
once presided.
In early June, in a gesture that was meant to ease the
strained relations between the two, Jackson invited
Clinton to speak before a gathering of the National
Rainbow Coalition, the organization headed by Jackson.
Clinton used the opportunity tosharpl) criticize Jackson
and the Rainbow ( loalition for lni\ ing in\ ited rap singei
Sister Souljah to speak ai the conference the previous
mght. Clinton berated conference organizers i<>r m\ it
ing the singer after the Washington Post reported thai
she had called fora week of killing whites follow ing the
Los Angeles rebellions, remarks she says were taken
out-of-eontexl. 1 "
It is broadly believed thai Clinton's attack on Sister
Souljah was a calculated political taetie engineered b\
his campaign to demonstrate his willingness to chal-
lenge Jackson and other constituencies viewed b\ main
whites as Democratic special interests. To a great
degree, Clinton's gamble paid off. 1 le w on support from
moderate and liberal white columnists," the New York
Times editorial page, 12 and certain blackelected officials
including Cleveland Mayor Michael White and Repre-
sentative Mike Espy (D-MS).
Jackson and many of his supporters responded an-
grily to Clinton's verbal attack on Souljah and argued
that millions of black voters were being turned off by
these kind of tactics and insults." Ron Walters, chair-
man of Howard University's Political Science Depart-
ment, wrote that "this incident will, no doubt, deepen the
cynicism in the black community with respect to the
current election and about Clinton's candidacy in par-
ticular. 14
Black Votes vs. White Votes
Most important, however, is the belief of a number of
black political experts that Clinton has little chance of
winning if there is a depressed black voter turnout. In the
last three presidential elections, the Democratic party
has lost about two-thirds of the white vote. 15 Of the three
elections won by the Democratic party since 1960
—
John Kennedy, 1960; Lyndon Johnson, 1964; and Jimmy
Carter, 1976—the black vote has been pivotal in two, in
1960 and 1976. In 1960, the black vote was critical in
fifteen states that totaled 209 electoral votes for Kennedy,
more than two-thirds of the total he needed to win. 16
Nationwide, Kennedy won 70 percent of the black
vote. 17 In 1976, southerner Carter won only 45 percent
of the white vote in the South, but won more than 90
percent of the black vote. 18
It has been argued that ifDemocratic nominees Walter
Mondale in 1984 and Michael Dukakis in 1988 had
aggressively registered and turned out traditional Demo-
cratic constituencies, particularly in the black commu-
nity, they may have won. Dukakis won 86-90 percent of
the black vote, but only 41-44 percent of the white
vote. 19 Clinton's chances of winning without a massive
black turnout, while not impossible, is still highly ques-
tionable.
Clinton's campaign strategy of going after the white
suburban vote, however, is one of desperation. Even
with a strong black voter turnout, Clinton can not win
without getting close to half or more of the white vote,
something the Democrats have not done in a presidential
election since 1964. The inability to win at least half of
the white vote has meant that, in recent presidential
elections, the Democrats have lost in every southern
state despite winning close to 90 percent of the black
vote. In one poll taken at the end of May, Clinton was
only winning about 20 percent of the white vote.20
For the Democrats, as with this year's black vote,
there was a sharp decline in the white vote during the
1992 primaries. In Mississippi and New Jersey, for
example, white voter turnout for the Democrats fell
sharply from 1988 levels. In Mississippi, white voter
turnout dropped 44 percent and in New Jersey, it fell 41
Clinton's chances of winning without a
massive black turnout, while not impossible, is
still highly questionable. .
.
percent. Dramatic white voter decline has also existed
in states that will be critical to a Democratic victory in
November, including California ( 1 1 percent), Florida
(12 percent), and New York (28 percent). 21
To win back the white vote, the Clinton campaign has
elaborated a strategy that targets the suburban vote
where about half of the electorate is located. Rather than
focus on the South or on urban areas, this strategy is
aimed at such predominantly suburban states as Califor-
nia, Oregon, Washington, Montana, Wisconsin, Penn-
sylvania, New York, and Connecticut, among others. 22
Within the framework of the suburban strategy, the
impact of the black vote is greatly diminished. The
southern states, where over half of the black vote is
located, are written off, for the most part. With Clinton
and his vice-presidential choice, Senator Al Gore of
Tennessee, on the ticket, it is very possible that the
Democrats will win in Arkansas and Tennessee. How-
ever, they are given a slim chance of winning in other
southern states, even with a high black voter turnout.
The Clinton-Gore ticket, therefore, has placed top prior-
ity on targeted suburban areas in the Midwest, the West
Coast, and Eastern Seaboard—regions where the black
vote is minimal.
In the days immediately following the Democratic
National Convention, this strategy appeared to have a
tremendous appeal. In a USA Today-CNN poll, Clinton
had bounced back from a preconvention rating of about
25 percent to 53 percent only three days after the
convention. 23 Clinton's distancing himself from Jack-
son and his image as a solid moderate as a result of the
convention contributed to his surge.
Black Vote Potential
Still, the black community has the ability to signifi-
cantly impact the election. Clinton could win in a close
election if he is the beneficiary of a strong, united black
voter turnout. A depressed black voter turnout would
probably nullify black voter impact, but a united black
vote would be a highly attractive prize. Clinton has
shown to some degree that he wants that block of votes
and has toned down his rhetoric concerning a tax cut for
the (white) middle class.
Perot has done precious little outreach to communi-
ties of color. In fact, his remarks concerning gays, where
he stated that he would not select a gay person to be in
his cabinet and added that he would not "just limit it to
that category," sent an alarming warning signal to many
blacks about his prejudices. 24 Perot further alienated
himself from blacks when he referred to them as "you
people" in a major speech before the NAACP national
convention. African Americans have other reasons to
fear Perot. His drug war campaign in Texas called for the
cordoning off ofblack and Hispanic communities, to the
enduring ire of local black leaders, and his intervention
also led to the weakening of the hard-won Dallas Police
Citizens Review Board. 25
Clinton was undoubtedly puzzled and surprised by
earlier polls showing that a significant number of blacks
planned to vote for Perot. Perot won the support ofNew
York's influential Reverend Calvin Butts and the former
football great, O.J. Simpson. Rumors were even circu-
lating that Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder was at one
time being considered as a vice-presidential choice by
the Perot camp.
It remains to be seen if the Democrats will find a way
to inspire a large and supportive black voter turnout in
November. Clinton's selection of issues, the Demo-
cratic party's treatment of Jackson, the strategies em-
ployed by Clinton's black supporters, the actions of
Jackson, and how the Perot candidacy will determine the
nature of the black vote and, perhaps, the outcome of the
presidential race itself.
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The Dawning of a New Era
Is the American political system becoming more
inclusive of and responsive to black women? The fact
that black women are seeking elective office is evidence
of marked advancement. However, their inclusion can-
not even be called gradual—it is occasional.
Amid the excitement and wonder over the dawning of
a new era in politics for women, the general exclusion of
black women from the formal process persists. This is
reflective of the status assigned to them by mainstream
American society. By their resistance to this, as well as
Masses of black women have made vast
contributions in the struggle against oppression
through family, community, the educational
system, the arts, politics-in all spheres oj
American life.
to the overall program of white supremacist oppression,
black women have forged a tradition of empowerment
activism. Because it seeks to break the monopoly of
white control over societal arrangements, empower-
ment activism is adversary to mainstream political func-
tions.
A more critical question is this: Can the American
political system, one of the pillars of a society stratified
by racism, sexism, and classism, accommodate the pres-
ence ofblack women? Ifmere accommodation were the
goal, the onus would no doubt be placed upon black
women and their presence would likely be a dim one.
The existing political framework was not intended for
the full participation of any group other than the one
which dominates it. Only when this framework is
dismantled, or at the least, undergoes substantial ideo-
logical restructuring, will it allow for the equitable
representation of the nation's disenfranchised citizens.
In the meantime, masses of black women will continue
their tradition of activism, though still largely unac-
knowledged.
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